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Financing of international collective action for epidemic and 
pandemic preparedness
The global pandemic response has typically followed 
cycles of panic followed by neglect. We are now, once 
again, in a phase of neglect, leaving the world highly 
vulnerable to massive loss of life and economic shocks 
from natural or human-made epidemics and pandemics. 
Quantifying the size of the losses caused by large-scale 
outbreaks is challenging because the epidemiological 
and economic research in this field is still at an early 
stage. Research on the 1918 influenza H1N1 pandemic 
and recent epidemics and pandemics has shown a range 
of estimated losses (panel).1–7
A limitation in assessing the economic costs of 
outbreaks is that they only capture the impact on 
income. Fan and colleagues8 recently addressed 
this limitation by estimating the “inclusive” cost of 
pandemics: the sum of the cost in lost income and a 
dollar valuation of the cost of early death. They found 
that for Ebola and severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS), the true (“inclusive”) costs are two to three 
times the income loss. For extremely serious pandemics 
such as that of influenza in 1918, the inclusive costs are 
over five times income loss. The inclusive costs of the 
next severe influenza pandemic could be US$570 billion 
each year or 0·7% of global income (range 0·4–1·0%)8—
an economic threat similar to that of global warming, 
which is expected to cost 0·2–2·0% of global income 
annually. Given the magnitude of the threat, we call for 
scaled-up financing of international collective action for 
epidemic and pandemic preparedness.
Two planks of preparedness must be strengthened. 
The first is public health capacity—including human and 
animal disease surveillance—as a first line of defence.9 
Animal surveillance is important since most emerging 
infectious diseases with outbreak potential originate 
in animals. Rigorous external assessment of national 
capabilities is critical; WHO developed the Joint External 
Evaluation (JEE) tool specifically for this purpose.10 
Financing for this first plank will largely be through 
domestic resources, but supplementary donor financing 
to low-income, high-risk countries is also needed.
The second plank is financing global efforts 
to accelerate research and development (R&D) 
of vaccines, drugs, and diagnostics for outbreak 
control, and to strengthen the global and regional 
outbreak preparedness and response system. These 
two international collective action activities are 
underfunded.11
Medical countermeasures against many emerging 
infectious diseases are currently missing. We need 
greater investment in development of vaccines, 
therapeutics, and diagnostics to prevent potential 
outbreaks from becoming humanitarian crises. The 
new Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations 
(CEPI), which aims to mobilise $1 billion over 5 years, is 
developing vaccines against known emerging infectious 
diseases as well as platforms for rapid development 
of vaccines against outbreaks of unknown origin. The 
WHO R&D Blueprint for Action to Prevent Epidemics12 
is a new mechanism for coordinating and prioritising 
the development of drugs and diagnostics for emerging 
infectious diseases. Consolidating and enhancing donor 
support for these new initiatives would be an efficient 
way to channel resources aimed at improving global 
outbreak preparedness and response.
Crucial components of the global and regional system 
for outbreak control include surge capacity (eg, the ability 
to urgently deploy human resources); providing technical 
guidance to countries in the event of an outbreak; and 
establishing a coordinated, interlinked global, regional, 
and national surveillance system. These activities are the 
remit of several essential WHO financing envelopes that 
For the Coalition for Epidemic 
Preparedness Innovations see 
http://cepi.net
Panel: Health and economic impacts of epidemics and 
pandemics
H1N1 influenza (1918)
•	 50	million	deaths;1 gross domestic product (GDP) loss of 
3% in Australia, 15% in Canada, 17% in the UK, and 11% in 
the USA2
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) (2003)
•	 774	deaths;3 global economic loss of US$52·2 billion4
Ebola (2013)
•	 10	600	deaths	and	a	GDP	loss	of	US$2·8 billion across 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone5
Zika (2015–16)
•	 20	deaths6 and an expected loss of US$3·5 billion in the 
Latin American and Caribbean region7
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all face major funding shortfalls. The Contingency Fund 
for Emergencies finances surge outbreak response for 
up to 3 months. The fund has a capitalisation target of 
$100 million of flexible voluntary contributions, which 
needs to be replenished with about $25–50 million 
annually, depending on the extent of the outbreak 
in any given year. However, as of April 30, 2017, only 
$37·65	million	had	been	contributed,	with	an	additional	
$4 million in pledges.13 The WHO Health Emergencies 
and Health Systems Preparedness Programmes face an 
annual shortfall of $225 million in funding their epidemic 
and pandemic prevention and control activities.14
Previous health emergencies have shown that it 
can take time to organise global collective action and 
provide financing to the national and local level. In such 
situations, a global mechanism should offer a rapid 
injection of liquidity to affected countries. The World 
Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) is 
a proposed global insurance mechanism for pandemic 
emergencies.15 It aims to provide surge funding for 
response efforts to help respond to rare, high-burden 
disease outbreaks, preventing them from becoming 
more deadly and costly pandemics. The PEF currently 
proposes a coverage of $500 million for the insurance 
window; increasing the current coverage will require 
additional donor commitments. In addition, the PEF has 
a $50–100 million replenishable cash window.
As the world’s health ministers meet this month for 
the World Health Assembly, we propose five key ways 
to help prevent mortality and economic shocks from 
disease outbreaks. First, to accelerate development 
of new technologies to control outbreaks, donors 
should expand their financing for CEPI and support the 
WHO R&D Blueprint for Action to Prevent Epidemics. 
Second, funding gaps in the WHO Contingency Fund 
for Emergencies and the WHO Health Emergencies 
Programme should be urgently filled and the PEF should 
be fully financed. Third, all nations should support 
their own and other countries’ national preparedness 
efforts, including committing to the JEE process. 
Fourth, we believe it would be valuable to create and 
maintain a regional and country-level pandemic risk 
and preparedness index. This index could potentially be 
used as a way to review preparedness in International 
Monetary Fund article IV consultations (regular country 
reports by staff to its Board). Finally, we call for a new 
global effort to develop long-term national, regional, 
and global investment plans to create a world secure 
from the threat of devastation from outbreaks.
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This article summarises the recommendations of a workshop held at the 
National Academy of Medicine, Washington, DC, USA, co-hosted by the Center 
for Policy Impact in Global Health at Duke University, Durham, NC, USA and the 
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, Oslo, Norway. Participants’ 
travel and accommodation were supported by the Center for Policy Impact in 
Global Health. BO is a consultant to Metabiota, a private company engaged in 
infectious disease risk modelling and analytical services. In this capacity, he has 
led the development of an index measuring national capacity to respond to 
epidemic and pandemic disease outbreaks. 
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